

Message Text

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NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15

NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PRS-01 ISO-00 /116 W

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FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5754

INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMCONGEN HONG KONG PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CAPETOWN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USUN 0474

UNSUMMARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

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SUBJECT: USUN DAILY CLASSIFIED SUMMARY NO. 23

SECURITY COUNCIL AND DJIBOUTI INCIDENT--

AT INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON DJIBOUTI INCIDENT, SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT MOYNIHAN READ SOMALI LETTER. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING ON BETWEEN THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND SOMALI GOVERNMENT CONCERNING REPATRIATION OF THE WOUNDED CHILD, AND WHILE THE FRENCH ARE NOT INSISTING ON AN URGENT SC MEETING, IF SOMALIA INSISTS ON ONE THE FRENCH ARE PREPARED TO MEET. THE TANZANIAN REPRESENTATIVE SUGGESTED SC PRESIDENT MEET WITH THE FRENCH AND SOMALI REPRESENTATIVES TO SEE WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S GOOD OFFICES MIGHT BE USEFUL. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD FURTHER INFORMAL SC CONSULTATIONS FEBRUARY 9. MEANTIME, SOMALI REPRESENTATIVE HUSSEIN AGREED THAT HE, THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE AND SC PRESIDENT WOULD DISCUSS PROGRESS IN THE FENCH-SOMALI TALKS AND THAT IF A FORMAL MEETING WERE CALLED IT WOULD BE IN RESPONSE TO BOTH FRENCH AND SOMALI REQUESTS. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE -- OURTEL 473)

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

AT PRESS CONFERENCE, HUSSEIN ACCUSED FRANCE OF ARMED AGGRESSION AND PROVOCATIVE ACTS AGAINST HIS COUNTRY, STATED 23 SOMALIS HAD BEEN KILLED, 25 OTHERS WOUNDED, AND THREE CUSTOMS POLICE ABUDCTED. HE DENIED SOMALI FORCES FIRED AT THE FRENCH, SAID THAT THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT IS NEGOTIATING FOR THE ABDUCTED BOY'S RELEASE AND RETURN TO HIS PARENTS, AND ADMITTED LIBERATION MOVEMENT OPERATED ON SOMALI TERRITORY. (OURTEL 471)

END UNCLASSIFIED

POLISH CANDIDACY FOR COMMITTEE 1 CHAIRMAN SHIP--

THE POLISH MISSION INFORMED USUN BY LETTER OF POLISH REPRESENTATIVE JAROSZEK'S CANDIDACY FOR THE POST OF COMMITTEE 1 CHAIRMAN AT THE 31 ST GA. THE LETTER REPORTS EASTERN EUROPEAN GROUP ENDORSEMENT OF THE CANDIDACY. (CONFIDENTIAL --OURTEL456)

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BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY COUNCIL --COMOROS' COMPLAINT

THE FIVE-POWER DRAFT RESOLUTION (S/11967), WHICH WOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT HOLDING A REFERENDUM BY FRANCE IN MAYOTTE CONSTITUTED INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE COMOROS AND WHICH WOULD

HAVE CALLED ON FRANCE TO DESIST FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE REFERENDUM FEBRUARY 8, WAS NOT ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL FEBRUARY 6 BECAUSE OF FRANCE'S VETO. VOTE WAS 11-1(FRANCE)-3(ITALY, UK, US). EXCHANGES ON ANGOLA WERE PRECIPITATED BY SOVIET COMMENTS, WHICH WERE REJECTED BY THE UK AND THE U.S. FOLLOWING THE VOTE, LIBYA, BENIN AND PANAMA EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON THE RIGHT OF FRANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTE, AND A LENGTHY PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT TOOK PLACE. PRESIDENT MOYNIHAN STATED THAT HAD THE QUESTION BEEN ASKED BEFORE THE VOTE, THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE DEFENDED FRANCE'S RIGHT TO VOTE. BOYD (PANAMA) STRESSED THE NEED FOR A JURIDICAL OPINION IN ORDER TO BE PREPARED FOR FUTURE SITUATIONS.

GUYANA-JACKSON NOTED THAT THE COMOROS, COMPOSED OF FOUR ISLANDS, HAD BEEN ADMITTED TO UN MEMBERSHIP. REGARDING FRANCE'S ATTITUDE, HE SAID THAT A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES IN ANY STATE WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER. IT WAS NOT UP TO THE SC TO SAY HOW SUCH A CONFLICT SHOULD BE RESOLVED; TO DO SO WOULD BE TO INTERFERE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THAT STATE. HE APPEALED TO FRANCE TO DESIST FROM AN ILL-ADVISED COURSE OF ACTION.

TANZANIA--SALIM, INTRODUCING THE RESOLUTION WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "MODERATE," SAID THAT THE SPONSORS TOOK A VERY SERIOUS VIEW OF ANYTHING THAT WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION THE NATIONAL UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE NEW STATE. CONSULTATIONS HAD BEEN HELD DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS WITH THE FRENCH DELEGATION WITH THE AIM OF REACHING A SOLUTION THAT COULD GAIN GENERAL SUPPORT,

BUT REGRETTABLY THE DIFFERENCES COULD NOT BE BRIDGED. HE HOPED IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SPONSORS COULD NOT COMPROMISE ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.

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CHINA--HUAN HUA STATED THAT THE COMOROS CONSISTED OF FOUR ISLANDS, INCLUDING MAYOTTE, AND ITS UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY MUST BE RESPECTED. BASING ITSELF ON THAT PRINCIPLED POSITION, CHINA FAVORED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

PAKISTAN --AKHUND, EXPRESSING REGRET THAT MR. MOYNIHAN WAS LEAVING THE UN, SAID THE QUESTION BEFORE THE SC, ON ITS FACE, INVOLVED A CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN THE CHARTER, NAMELY SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES. HE CITED KASHMIR AND BANGLADESH. HE COULD SYMPATHIZE WITH THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, BUT FELT IT WOULD HARDLY BE PROPER FOR SC MEMBERS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SUCH MATTERS. THE UN COULD NOT ACCEPT THE POSITION THAT CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES OR INHIBITIONS OF ONE OF ITS MEMBER STATES COULD

HAVE THE EFFECT OF OVERRULING UN DECISIONS. THE FRENCH RESERVATION ON THE GA RESOLUTION ADMITTING THE COMOROS TO UN MEMBERSHIP COULD NOT AFFECT THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF THE GA'S ACTION. IF FRANCE FELT COMPELLED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROPOSED REFERENDUM IT MUST NOT EXPECT THE UN TO RECOGNIZE OR ACCEPT THE RESULTS IF THEY INFRINGED ON THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COMOROS. INSTEAD, FRANCE SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO RECONCILE THE POINTS OF VIEWS OF THE PARTIES.

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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 USUN 0474

UNSUMMARY

SOVIET UNION--MALIK SAID, ON THE BASIS OF PRESS
REPORTS, HE BELIEVED THE SC PRESIDENT WAS "HOLDING A KIND OF
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SWAN SONG" IN THE UN. HE HOPED THAT "SWAN SONG" WOULD BE BASED
ON STRENGTHENING COOPERATION, ON THE BASIS OF THE CHARTER,
AMONG STATES OF DIFFERENT SYSTEMS. HE THEN SUPPORTED THE COMORIAN
POSITION AND STRESSED SOVIET SOLIDARITY WITH ALL PEOPLES STRUGGLING
FOR INDEPENDENCE. HE WNET ON TO SAY THAT ONE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE AND A SECRETARY OF STATE HAD BEEN TRYING TO
DISTORT THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING COLONIAL
MATTERS. THERE HAD BEN SLANDERING REMARKS ABOUT ALLEGED "SOVIET
EXPANSIONISM" OR EVEN ATTEMPTS BY THE SOVIET UNION "TO
CREATE COLONIES" . THESE WERE RIDICULOUS DISTORTIONS
OF THE PEACE-LOVING FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHCIH
HAD BORNE THE BRUNT OF THE AGRESSION OF HITLERITE FASCISM,
BUT WHICH IN WINNING THAT WAR HAD LED THE FIGHT FOR THE END OF
COLONIALISM. THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTED ALL NATIONAL LIBERATION
MOVEMENTS WITHOUT SEEKING ANY ADVANTAGE FOR ITSELF, MALIK DECLARED.

ROMANIA --DATCU FELT THE RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM
HAD BEEN VALID FOR THE COMOROS AND A WHOLE, AND THE UN IN
ADMITTING THE NEW STATE TO MEMBERSHIP STIPULATED THAT THE UNITY
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COMOROS SHOULD BE RESPECTED.

UK-MURRAY DESCRIBED PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE IN LONDON AS WELL
AS PARIS, AND, WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE VIEWS OF TANZANIA
AND OTHERS, STRESSED THAT "CLEARLY INTENTIONS ARE DIFFERENT
FROM COMMITMENTS, AND PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORITY WAS NECESSARY
BEFORE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT COULD MAKE SUCH
COMMITMENTS." HE SPOKE OF THE PROBLEMS OF SMALL TERRITORIES
AND THE TENDENCY FOR TENSIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT ISLANDS TO
MOUNT AS THE DAY OF INDEPENDENCE OR SELF-DETERMINATION DREW NEAR.
HE HOPED SOME FOMULA COULD BE FOUND WHICH "WILL ALLOW THE LINKS
WHICH EXISTED IN THE PAST BETWEEN THE FOUR ISLANDS
TO PERSIST IN SOME FORM OR ANOTHER IN THE FUTURE." SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVE MALIK, MURRAY CONTINNUED, HAD HIS OWN WAY
OF LOOKING AT THINGS, WHETHER OF EVENTS IN THE PAST OR IN
ANGOLA TODAY. IN HIS VIEW, THE FACTS WERE CLEAR--"CUBAN
SOLDIERS, EXTREMELY WELLARMED WITH SOVIET WEAPONS, ARE KILLING
AFRICANS IN AFRICA, HAVING CROSSED THE ATLANTIC FOR THAT PURPOSE."

JAPAN --KANAZAWA THOUGHT THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONFLICT-
ING VIEWS OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A
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SOLUTION MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE TWO PARTIES, IT WAS
APPROPRIATE THAT THE TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS
OF FRANCE AND THE COMOROS BE RESUMED WITH A VIEW TO RECONCILING
THOS DIFFERENCES.

ITALY--VINCI SAID THE INTERESTS OF THE POPULATION IN ALL THE
COMORO ISLANDS "CALL FOR SOME KIND OF AN AGREEMENT ON A REALISTIC
BASIS." AND HE APPEALED TO ALL PARTIES TO COOPERATE AMICABLY.

--MORE EXCHANGES ON ANGOLA--

MALIK SAID THAT FOR SEVEN YEARS HE HAD BEEN AMBASSADOR TO THE
UK AND HE WAS CONVINCED THAT HATRED OF THE SOVIETS WAS LIMITED
TO TORIES, BUT HE FOUND "THIS CNACER WAS ALO PART OF THE REPRESENTAT
IVE
OF THE LABOR GOVERNMENT." RECENTLY, THAT CANCER HAD AGAIN BEEN
REVEALED BY MRS. THATCHER. HE DECLARED THAT THE KILLING IN
ANGOLA WAS BEING DONE BY THOSE SUPPORTING THE BANDITS AND
SOUTH AFRICAN RACISTS, SUCH AS THE UK. LONDON WAS THE
CENTER OF RECRUITMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MURDERERS OF THE
ANGOLAN PEOPLE. HE HOPED THE RESISTANCE OF THE WORKERS TO BRITISH
INTERVENTION IN THE SOVIET UNION IN 1917 WOULD REASSERT
ITSELF AND SAY TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, " HANDS OFF
ANGOLA." SOVIET ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO THE LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA WAS CONSISTENT WITH ITS POLICY AND
THE OAU POSITION. THE LEADERS OF LIBERATED COUNTRIES EVERYWHERE
WERE GRATEFUL TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR HAVING LIBERATED THEM;
OTHERWISE, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN SLAVES. THE TRUTH CANNOT
BE COVERED BY PRESIDENTS, AMBASSADORS OR SENATORS. AMBASSADOR
DE GUIRINGAUD HAD NOT REALIED HE COULD NOT QUOTE THE SOVIET
CONSITUTION AS HE DID THE OTHER DAY BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION
IS NOT A COLONAIL POWER. HE DIDNT'T HAVE TO ANSWER
FOR CUBA, CUBA COULD DEFEND ITSLEF. THE INTERFERENCE IN ANGOLA
WAS BY SOUTH AFRICA, ASSISTED OPENLY AND COVERTLY BY FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN AN ATTMEPT TO CREATE A GOVERNMENT
OF THEIR CHOICE. THE IMPERIALIST PRESS WAS CONFUSING THE ISSUES--
PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO A LAWFUL GOVERNMENT AT ITS REQUEST, AND
INTERVENTIONISM, MALIK DECLARED.

MURRAY (UK) STRESSING HE WAS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HER MAJESTY'S
GOVT, COMMENTED THERE WERE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF
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"SCALAWAGS"- FROM HIS COUNTRY INTERVENING IN ANGOLAN AFFAIRS BUT NOT WITH HMG ENCOURAGEMENT. ON FEBRUARY 4 ENNALS HAD CONDEMNED THIS PRACTICE. HE FELT MALIK HAD NOT REPLIED ADEQUATELY TO HIS "COMP ARATIVELY MILD OBSERVATION" THAT "SOVIET ARMS ARE BING USED TO KILL AFRICANS."

MOYNIHAN, SPEAKING AS U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, SAID MALIK'S LANGUAGE "TOOK US BACK TO THE GRIMMEST DAYS OF THE COLD WAR." IMMEDIATELY ON A POINT OF ORDER, MALIK DECLARED THAT THE SC WAS DISCUSSING THE COMOROS. MOYNIHAN RESPONDED THAT IT HAD BEEN AT MALIK'S INITIATIVE THAT THE COUNCIL HAD "GONE FROM THE COMOROS ARCHIPELAGO TO INVOKE THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO. " AFTER ACCUSING MALIK OF MAKING THREATS, HE SAID THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE COULD MAKE WHATEVER REMARKS HE WISHED ABOUT THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BUT SHOULD NOT SPEAK OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE TERMS HE USED. THIS IS NOT A PURGE TRIAL. SUDDENLY, MOYNIHAN CONTINUED, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A CENTURY, A EUROPEAN ARMY HAS REAPPEARED IN AFRICA. THE U.S. HAD NOT RAISED THE ISSUE IN THE COUNCIL; IT WAS THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE WHO HAD DONE SO. THE PRESIDENT OF ZAMBIA HAD SPOKEN OF "THE PLUNDERING TIGER AND ITS MURDEROUS CUBS, " AND NO ONE IN THE ROOM WAS UNAWARE OF WHOM PRESIDENT KAUNDA MEANT. MOYNIHAN CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE SUBJECTED TO "THE BULLYING OF A GENERATION LONG GONE AND WELL RID OF." (OURTEL 469 NOTAL)

MALIK RETORTED THAT MOYNIHAN WOULD BE "LAUGHED AT" FOR THOSE "XLANDERS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION." HE DENIED HAVING MADE THREATS, AND CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS BEING "DISTORTED."

--DISCUSSION OF COMOROS RESUMED--

MADGASCAR--RABETAFIKA COMMENTED THAT THE SC SEEMED "TO HAVE BECOME LOST IN THE ATLANTIC WHEN IT WAS DISCUSSING AN ISSUE AFFECTING THE INDIAN OCEAN." IN HIS VIEW, THE REFERENDUM HAD BEEN ON A TERRITORIAL BASIS AND MAYOTTE WAS PART OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF THE COMOROS. HE NOTED THAT THAT COMOROS HAD STRATEGIC VALUE WHICH COULD NOT BE INGORED IN ANALYZING THE SITUATION. CONFIDENTIAL

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SAUDI ARABIA--BAROODY SAID THEY WOULD MISS MR. MOYNIHAN AND ADDED IT WAS GOOD SOMETIMES TO BE UNORTHODOX IN ONE'S APPROACH.

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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 USUN 0474

UNSUMMARY

TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF THE COMOROS, BAROODY SAID "SELF-
DETERMINATION BY FRAGMENTATION" WOULD LEAVE NO COUNTRY

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WHOLE, CITING THE SCOTCH, WELSH, WALLOONS, BRETONS, CORSICANS AND BASQUES.

NIGERIA--DECLARING THAT STATEMENTS IN THE SC TODAY "TURNED HIS BACK UP", HARRIMAN SAID
INDIA, BRAZIL AND NIGERIA ALL RECOGNIZED THE MPLA AND THEY WERE NOT SOVIET "CLIENTS." HE FOUND THE STRAIGHT-FORWARDNESS OF THE SC PRESIDENT CHARACTERISTIC OF WHAT WAS EXPECTED WITHIN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. AS FOR THE COMOROS, HE SAID, INTER ALIA, IT WAS NOT TOO LATE FOR FRANCE TO REVERT TO ITS ORIGINAL GOOD INTENTIONS OF RECOGNIZING THE NEW NATION AS A SOVEREIGN AND UNITED STATE.

FRANCE--DE GUIRINGAUD THOUGHT FRENCH PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT WAS THE BEST PROOF OF THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. PARLIAMENT DECIDED NOT TO FOLLOW THE PRESIDENT'S ADVICE. IN THE U.S., SIMILAR SITUATIONS OCCURRED. "THIS IS DEMOCRACY AS PRACTICED IN THE WEST", HE REMARKED.

--EXPLANATIONS OF VOTES--

SWEDEN WOULD VOTE FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. JAPAN WOULD ALSO VOTE FOR IT, BUT HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1, WHICH MIGHT CREATE OBSTACLES TO THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. FOLLOWING THE VOTE, DE GUIRINGAUD REGRETTED HE HAD TO VOTE AGAINST THE DRAFT. FRANCE COULD NOT LET IT GO THROUGH, GIVEN THE DIFFICULTIES IT WAS FACED WITH. FRANCE'S "VETO" WAS NOT A BRUTAL END TO HOPE; HOWEVER, FRANCE COULD NOT SIDESTEP A PROBLEM THAT WAS REAL. HIS GOVERNMENT REMAINED SINCERELY READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMOROS. IN CONCLUSION, HE REGRETTED MOYNIHAN'S DECISION TO LEAVE THE UN.

--DID FRANCE HAVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE?--

PAQUI (BENIN) WONDERED WHETHER FRANCE WAS ENTITLED TO CAST A VETO ON THE MATTER, AND HE THOUGHT THE QUESTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. KIKHIA (LIBYA) DID NOT BELIEVE FRANCE HAD A RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE PRESENT CASE, AND HE WISHED TO PLACE ON RECORD HIS SUPPORT FOR BENIN'S POSITION REGARDING CHARTER ARTICLE 27, PARAGRAPH 3, WHICH HE READ OUT. DE GUIRINGAUD NOTED THAT IN MARCH
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1973 IN A MATTER BRINGING THE U.S. INTO CONFLICT WITH PANAMA, NO ONE HAD OBJECTED TO THE USE OF THE U.S. VETO AT THAT TIME. HE COULD
LD
CITE "AN IMPRESSIVE LIST OF PRECEDENTS."

BOYD (PANAMA) STATED THE VOTE IN PANAMA DID NOT CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT. THEN THE SC WAS DEALING WITH A SITUATION AFFECTING A REGION, NOT A DISPUTE. PANAMA HAD NOT BROUGHT A COMPLAINT AGAINST THE U.S. HE SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO CARRY OUT A SERIOUS JURIDICAL STUDY OF THE QUESTION IN THE EVENT IT AROSE AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. DURING THE COURSE OF 15 SUBSEQUENT INTERVENTIONS BY FRANCE, PANAMA, LIBYA THE SC PRESIDENT, AND TANZANIA, BOYD SAID JURISTS SHOULD BE ASKED TO CONSIDER THE MATTER SERIOUSLY. HE HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THE RIGHT OF VETO COULD BE EXERCISED WHEN A PERMANENT MEMBER WAS A PARTY TO A DISPUTE BEFORE THE SC. DE GUIRINGAUD SAID THE 1973 PANAMA RESOLUTION REFERRED TO ENDANGERING PEACE. HE HAD NOT MADE A PARALLEL BETWEEN THE COMOROS PROBLEM AND THE PANAMA CANAL ISSUE, NOTING THAT NEITHER CASE INVOLVED "ARMED AGGRESSION."

BOYD STATED THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BENIN, LIBYA AND PANAMA WERE DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE MATTER SO THAT IN FUTURE THE PRESIDENT MIGHT TAKE A STAND WHEN THE ISSUE AROSE AGAIN. DE GUIRINGAUD SAID THE U.S. WAS PERFECTLY ENTITLED TO VOTE IN PANAMA, AS FRANCE WAS PERFECTLY ENTITLED TO VOTE TODAY. BOYD ARGUED THAT NO ONE RAISED A QUESTION IN PANAMA ABOUT THE U.S. VETO; AND AS FOR THE "LONG LIST OF PRECEDENTS," HE HAD BEEN TOLD OF PRECEDENTS TO THE CONTRARY, INCLUDING AN ARGENTINE ABSTENTION. THE LIBYAN REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS "SLIPPERY TERRAIN," AND THE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ENCOURAGED HIM TO THINK THE ISSUE COULD BE RAISED AGAIN.

PRESIDENT MOYNIHAN STATED THAT THE SECRETARIAT MADE AVAILABLE A POSITION PAPER ON THE MATTER, AND HAD THE QUESTION BEEN RAISED "THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT THE RIGHT OF FRANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTING WOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED." KIKHIA DID NOT CONSIDER THAT STATEMENT A RULING. MOYNIHAN TOLD HIM IT WAS ONLY A STATEMENT OF INFORMATION. BOYD THOUGHT IN FUTURE ALL MEMBERS SHOULD COME FULLY PREPARED WITH PRECEDENTS BECAUSE DIFFERENT PRE-
8\$3,5 297)\$:853 DIFFERENT PRECEDENTS. PRESIDENT MOYNIHAN STATED THAT HE HAD GIVEN THE JUDGMENT THE SECRETARIAT PREPARED
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FOR HIM, WHICH WOULD BE THE SAME FOR ANY PRESIDENT. BOYD INSISTED ALL MEMBERS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR FUTURE OCCASIONS.

SALIM (TANZANIA) FOUND THE DEBATE ON THE PROPRIETY OF FRANCE'S VOTE "FASCINATING." HIS DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO GET MORE INFORMATION. THE FACT THAT THERE WERE PRECEDENTS DID NOT MEAN THAT THEY SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. MOYNIHAN'S VIEW OBVIOUSLY WAS PERSONAL, SALIM SAID. THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD NOT GIVE LEGAL ADVICE UNLESS REQUESTED BY THE SC, ESPECIALLY ON A MATTER OF SUCH IMPORTANCE. HE HOPED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT WOULD PAY HEED TO THE OVER-

WHELMING SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE COMORIANS.

PRESIDENT MOYNIHAN SAID THAT IF NO QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED IN ADVANCE ABOUT THE VOTE, THE OVERWHELMING PRESUMPTION MUST BE THAT "NO SHADOW OF IMPROPRIETY" HAD ARISEN AS REGARDS TO THE FRENCH VOTE.

AT THIS POINT MALIK INTERVENED TO SAY HE HAD JUST READ A U.S. PRESS RELEASE CONTAINING MOYNIHAN'S "HOSTILE" SPEECH TO HIM, IMPUTING WORDS HE NEVER USED. HE HAD SAID "TAKE HEED, " WHICH COULD NEVER BE TRANSLATED AS "TAKE CARE" OR "BEWARE". MOYNIHAN, SPEAKING FOR THE U.S., SAID HE SINCERELY REGRETTED IF THERE HAD BEEN A WRONG TRANSLATION. THE INTERPRETER USED THE WORDS "TAKE CARE". HE ASKED "FORGIVENESS FOR WHAT WAS A WHOLLY UNINTENDED MISTAKE" AND ASKED THAT THE CORRECTION BE MADE IN THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT. MALIK THEN SAID THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE: "THINK IT OVER, GENTLEMEN."

SAID OMAR MWINYI BARKA (COMOROS) THANKED THE SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, REGRETTED THE VETO, AND CONSIDERED THE VOTE "AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND MORAL VICTORY FOR OUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE". HE DESIRED NOTHING BUT FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING WITH THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE. HE REGRETTED THE "UNREASONABLE POSITION" ADOPTED BY FRANCE, BUT HOPED THAT RESPONSIBLE FRENCH AUTHORITIES WOULD RECON-

SIDER THEIR CURRENT COURSE OF ACTION AND THAT JUSTICE WOULD ULTIMATELY TRIUMPH. (REPEATED INFO KINSHASA, MOSCOW PANAMA AND TANARIVE)
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ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 ACDA-05 AF-06 AID-05 ARA-06 CIAE-00 DODE-00

EB-07 EA-07 EUR-12 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 LAB-04

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15

NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PRS-01 ISO-00 /116 W
----- 103766

O P 070824Z FEB 76
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5757
INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMCONGEN HONG KONG PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAPETOWN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 USUN 0474

UNSUMMARY

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSHIP OF WORLD FOOD PROGRAM--

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CANADIANS ANNOUNCED, AT WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS
GROUP MEETING, INTENTION TO PROPOSE GARSON VOGEL(IDENTIFIED AS
ACTIVE ON CANDIAN WHEAT AND GRAIN BOARDS, AND HIGHLY QUALIFIED)
FOR POSITION OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE WORLD FOOD
PROGRAM. (OURTEL 462)

HABITAT CONFERENCE BUREAU--

HABITAT SECRETARY GENERAL PENALOSA PROPOSED, AND ALL REGIONAL
GROUPS INFORMALLY ACCEPTED, A NEW FURMULA FOR ARRANGEMENTS
FOR BUREAU OFFICERS. AS A RESULT, THE PLENARY BUREAU WILL
BE COMPOSED OF CHAIRMAN (CANADA), RAPPORTERU (POLAND), AND
33 VICE PRESIDENTS AS FOLLOWS: ASIA 8, AFRICA 8, LATIN AMERICA 6,
WESTERN EUROPE 6, AND EASTERN EUROPE 5. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN GROUP
APPROVED SWEDEN AS RAPPORTEUR OF COMMITTEE I AND NORWAY AS VICE
CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEE II.
(OURTEL 463)

UN ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSHIP--

IN ADDITION TO AUSTRALIA, WEO GROUP MEMBERS NORWAY, ITALY AND UK INTEND TO PROPOSE CANDIDATES FOR UNEP EXECUTIVE DIRECTORSHIP. LATIN GROUP MAY HAVE CANDIDATE, AND CURRENT ACTING UNEP EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR TOLBA MAY ALSO SEEK POSITION. (OURTEL 461)

COMMITTEE ON RESTRUCTURING--

CANADIANS WERE INFORMED THAT THE G-77 HAD WITHDRAWN ITS CANDIDATE (FLEMMING OF ARGENTINA) FOR THE RAPPOREURSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE ON RESTRUCTURING. THUS, WASY SEEMS OPEN FOR ELECTION OF WEO CANDIDATE (STURKEY OF AUSTRALIA) AND FOR COMPELTION OF COMMITTEE'S BUREAU. (OURTEL 458)

SEYCHELLES --

BRITISH TOLD US THAT HMG WILL BE ISSUING WHITE PAPER ON THE SEYCHELLES SHORTLY. (OURTEL 470)

FIFTH INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT--

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ACCORDING TO UN SECRETARIAT, THUS FAR ONLY THE UK HAS SIGNED THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT. (OURTEL 459)

END UNCLASSIFIED)

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